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CASENOTES
Invocation of Miranda Rights: A Question of Fact?: Fare v. Michael C.' — On
February 4, 1976 the Van Nuys, California police arrested a sixteen-and-a-
half year old juvenile, Michael C., on suspicion of murder. 2 At the police
station, prior to any interrogation, Michael C. was informed of his rights
under Miranda v. Arizona. 3 He stated that he understood his rights and might
be willing to talk to the police.' Then, when asked if he would be willing to
talk to the police without an attorney present, Michael C. responded: "Can I
have my probation officer here?" 5 This request was refused.' The officer
' 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
I Id. at 710. When arrested Michael C. had a record of previous minor offenses,
had been on probation since age twelve, and had served a term in a youth corrections
camp. Id. The police had probable cause to arrest Michael C. Id.
3 Id. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), held that before any custodial
interrogation may take place a suspect must he informed that he has the right to
remain silent, that anything he says may be used against hint, and that he has the right.
to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. Id. at 467-73. Miranda
also required that custodial interrogation cease upon the suspect's request. for an at-
torney or his assertion of his right to remain silent. Id. at 444-45, 473-74. See text at
notes 43-47 infra.
442 U.S. at 710.
5 Id. The tape recorded exchange was as follows:
"Q. Do you understand all these rights as I have explained them to you?
"A. Yeah.
"Q. Okay, do you wish to give up your right to remain silent and talk to us
about this murder?
"A. What murder? I don't know about no murder.
"Q. I'll explain to you which one it is if you want to talk to us about it.
"A. Yeah, I might talk to you.
"Q. Do you want to give up your right to have an -attorney present here
while we talk about it?
"A. Can I have my probation officer here?
"Q. Well, I can't get a hold of your probation officer right now. You have
the right to an attorney.
"A. How I know you guys won't pull no police officer in and tell me he's
an attorney?
"Q. Huh?
"A. [How I know you guys won't pull no police officer in and tell me he'S
an attorney?1
"Q. Your probation officer is Mr. Christiansen.
"A. Yeah.
"Q. Well I'm not going to call Mr. Christiansen tonight. There's a good
chance we can talk to hint later, but I'm not going to call him right now. If
you want to talk to us without an attorney present, you can. If you don't
want to you don't have to. But if you want to say something you call, and if
you don't want to say something you don't have to. That's your right. You
understand that right?
"A. Yeah,
"Q. Okay, will you talk to us without an attorney present?
"A. Yeah. I want to talk to you."
Id. at 710-11 (emphasis in original).
6
 Id. at 710.
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again informed Michael C. of his right to an attorney. Michael C. then twice
asked in response "How I know you guys won't pull no police officer in and
tell me he's an attorney?"' The officer did not reply. Instead, he again as-
certained directly that Michael C. understood his rights and asked once more
if he was willing to talk to the police without an attorney. 8 Michael C. re-
sponded in the affirmative, and, in response to police questioning, made in-
criminating statements and sketches. 9 Michael C. was crying at the time he
talked with the police officers."
In juvenile court Michael C. moved to suppress these materials on the
basis that they were obtained in violation of his Miranda rights." He argued
that a request to see his probation officer was an invocation of his fifth
amendment right to remain silent'' and that, consequently, the failure of the
police to terminate questioning at that point rendered his statements and
sketches inadmissible as evidence against him in the juvenile court proceed-
ings,"
The juvenile court denied the motion to suppress." It held that whether
a minor has waived his right to remain silent is a question of fact," and that
on the facts Michael C. had waived his right.' 6 It adjudged Michael C. a ward
of the court and committed him to the California Youth Authority."
Id.
Id.
Id.
"' Id. at 733 n.2 (Powell, j., dissenting).
" Id. at 711-12. See text at notes 43-47 infra and note 3 supra.
12 Id. In relevant part, the fifth amendment provides: "nor shall any person be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ...." U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
13
 442 U.S. at 712. In support of this contention, Michael C. relied by analogy on
an earlier California case. People v. Burton, 6 Cal. 3d 375, 491 P.2d 793, 99 Cal. Rptr.
1 (197 1), which held that a minor's request to see his parents, in the absence of evi-
dence to the contrary, is to be construed as an invocation of his fifth amendment right.
442 U.S. at 712. See discussion in text at notes 49-53 infra. Michael C. called as a
witness at the suppression hearing his probation officer, who testified that he had
instructed Michael C. to contact him immediately if he ever had contact with the police
or other trouble, and that on a previous occasion he had reprimanded Michael C. for -
not following this instruction. Id. at 712.
14
 442 U.S. at 712.
'' Id. The juvenile court found People v. Burton, 6 Cal. 3d 375, 491 P,2d 793, 99
Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971), inapposite on the facts and therefore made its findings on the
basis of waiver rather than invocation. In re Michael C., 135 Cal. Rptr. 762, 765 (1977)
(vacated). See text at notes 111-20 infra.
l" 442 U.S. at 712. The Court reasoned that despite Michael C,'s request, he had
indicated clearly that he was willing to talk with the police; that the request and sub-
sequent agreement to talk had conic at the beginning of rather than after lengthy
interrogation; and, that Michael C. had had previous experience with the courts. Id. at
712-13. It should be noted that without the confession the evidence was insufficient to
'sustain a conviction. In re Michael C., 135 Cal. Rptr. 762 n.1 (1977) (vacated).
" Id. at 763. The commitment was pursuant to CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 602
(West Supp. 1979). In re Michael C., 21 Cal. 3d 471, 473, 579 P.2c1. 7, 8. 146 Cal. Rptr.
358, 359 (1978).
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The California Supreme Court in a 5-2 decision reversed Michael C.'s
conviction." It held that a minor's request to see his probation officer during
custodial interrogation is an invocation of his fifth amendment privilege in the
absence of proof by the state that the request was not so intended." Finding
that the state had not met its burden, 2 ° the court held that the incriminating
materials had been obtained unlawfully from Michael C. and their admission
into evidence against him, therefore, was reversible error. 2 '
The United States Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, reversed. 22 Inter-
preting the California Supreme Court's decision as having created the per se
rule that a juvenile's request for his probation officer during custodial inter-
rogation was an invocation of his fifth amendment rights, 23 the Court HELD:
first, that a juvenile's request to see his probation officer neither is analogous
to a request for an attorney nor compels a conclusion that the juvenile was
directly invoking his right to silence under Miranda; 24 and second, under the
"totality of the circumstances" approach of Miranda, 25 Michael C. had know-
ingly and voluntarily waived his rights." Consequently, the Court determined
that there was no error in admitting the incriminating materials into evi-
dence. 27 Three Justices, 28 joining in one of the case's two dissents, argued
from Miranda and other precedent that a juvenile's request for any adult obli-
gated to protect his interests must be treated as a per se assertion of his fifth
amendment rights. 2 " justice Powell, in a separate dissent, agreed with the
majority that the California Supreme Court had erred in extending the per se
rule of Miranda to encompass a juvenile's request for his probation officer, 30
but decided that, on the record, Michael C.'s statements had not been made
voluntarily."
Although the Supreme Court's decision in Fare v. Michael C. rests on the
narrow ground that a juvenile's request to see his probation officer is not a per
se invocation of his rights under Miranda, its significance is not restricted to its
28 Id. at 478, 579 P.2d at II, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 362 (1978).
1"
 Id.
211
21 Id.
22 442 U.S. at. 728.
23 Id. at 715-16 11.3. This casenote will focus on the per se rules of invocation de-
rived from Miranda, i.e., the request for an attorney and the indication of a desire to
remain silent. It should he noted, however, that the term per se is often used with
respect to other substantive and procedural rules of Miranda. For example, failure of
the police to terminate questioning upon a suspect's request for an attorney, is often
termed a per se violation of Miranda. Similarly, failure to give the required warnings
before initiating interrogation of a suspect is also termed a per se violation of Miranda.
24 442 U.S. at 723-24.
25 384 U.S. 436, 475-77. See text and notes at notes 58-60 & 211-12 infra.
28
 442 U.S. at 727.
27 Id.
28 Justice Marshall was joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens.
2"
 442 U.S. at 729. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S.
49 (1962); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
3°
 442 U.S. at 732.
31 Id. at 734.
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limited holding. Its significance is also reflected in that it is the first Supreme
Court decision to consider the manner in which an accused must invoke his
Miranda rights before the Miranda proscription against further interrogation
is triggered. As such, the decision signals the Court's unwillingness to extend
the per se rules of invocation which it announced in Miranda. If the decision
should be extended beyond the scope of its narrow holding, therefore, it is
probable that in future cases an accused will be allowed to invoke his rights
only through either an express request to have an attorney present or an
explicit statement of his unwillingness to talk to the police. 32
There is a critical, but to date largely unrecognized, distinction between
the concept of invocation of fifth amendment rights under Miranda and the
concept of waiver of those rights under that case. In developing this distinc-
tion, this casenote will first outline Miranda v. Arizona 33 and its relevant Su-
preme Court progeny which have developed the concept of waiver. It then will
discuss the concept of invocation of the fifth amendment rights introduced as
a question of fact under Miranda and developed more fully by the line of
California cases which culminated in In re Michael C. 34 The Supreme Court's
decision in the case will be examined. Finally, this casenote will discuss Fare v.
Michael C.'s, significance in the area of confessions under Miranda. It will be
suggested that the major weakness in the Supreme Court's decision is its fail-
ure to consider invocation of the fifth amendment rights as a question of fact
under Miranda.
I. MIRANDA, ITS PROGENY AND THE CONCEPT OF WAIVER
Based on its belief that the atmosphere inherent in incommunicado cus-
todial police interrogation compels an accused to incriminate himself where
he otherwise might not, the Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona established
a set of procedural safeguards to ensure that, consonant with the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination, an accused's statments were
the product of his free will and not of the coercive atmosphere. 3 .5 These
safeguards include the requirement that the suspect be informed of his con-
stitutional rights prior to any police interrogation 36 and that any statement
obtained in violation of these rights be excluded from evidence. 37 The pur-
pose of the requirement that the suspect be told his rights as a prerequisite to
questioning is four-fold: 1) to make a suspect aware of his rights; 2) to inform
him of the consequences of foregoing them; 3) to dispel the pressures of
custodial interrogation; and, 4) to show the suspect that the police are pre-
pared to honor his rights should he choose to exercise them. 38 To fulfill
32 Because the Court assumed without deciding that the principles of Miranda were
fully applicable in the juvenile proceedings before it, id. at 717 n.4, this casenote will
not discuss the desirability of emending Miranda to juvenile court proceedings.
" 384 U.S. 436 0966).
" 21 Cal. 3d, 471, 579 11 .2d 7, 146 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1978).
" 384 U.S. at 445, 455, 457-58, 467, 478.
3" Id. at 467-73.
37
 Id. at 477.
38 Id. at 467-73.
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these goals, the burden of affirmatively demonstrating that the required warn-
ings were given is placed on the state. 39 This demonstration, moreover, is a
pre-condition to the introduction at trial of any evidence which was obtained
through interrogation of the accused.'" Any confession obtained through in-
terrogation when not preceded by the required warnings is per se inadmissible
in evidence.'"
Miranda also fashioned as part of its protective devices two means by
which a suspect can demonstrate his intent to invoke the fifth amendment
privilege. The first means is by a statement any time prior to or during inter-
rogation that he wants the assistance of an attorney." This method of invok-
ing the right. against self-incrimination is grounded in the "vital role" 43 which
attorneys play in the criminal justice system and in their perceived ability to
protect the privilege' and dispel the inherent pressures of incommunicado
interrogation. 45
 The second method of invoking the privilege is by the sus-
. pect's "indicat[ing] in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning,
that he wishes to remain silent...... To ensure that a suspect's fifth
amendment rights are honored, Miranda directs that upon a suspect's invoca-
tion of his rights by either means police interrogation cease without regard to
the stage in the interrogation process at which they are exercised."
Miranda allows that a suspect might waive his right to the fifth amend-
ment privilege and to the presence of an attorney."' It carefully cir-
cumscribes, however, the procedural and substantive limits of an effective
waiver. A suspect's waiver must be both knowing and intelligent." Because
of the state's responsibility in establishing the circumstances under'which in-
terrogation takes place and because it alone possesses the means of providing
corroborative evidence, Miranda requires that the state shoulder the "heavy
burden" of proving that a suspect has knowingly and intelligently waived his
rights." A valid waiver can not be presumed from the accused's silence after
the warnings have been given or simply from the fact that a confession has
been obtained.St An affirmative showing that the accused has intelligently
and understandingly waived his rights is needed.' In addition, and as with
Id. at 475, 479.
4 " Id. at 444, 476, 479.
4 ' Id. at. 468-69, 479.
" Id. at 444-45, 473-74.
" Id. at 481.
44
	 at 472.
" Id. at 470. The Court also noted that the presence of counsel could serve several
subsidiary functions as well: 1) mitigation of the dangers of untrustworthiness should
the suspect decide to talk; 2) reduction of the likelihood that the police would practice
coercion; 3) in the event of police coercion, the attorney could so testify at trial; and 4)
ensuring that the accused gives a fully accurate statement to the police and that that
statement is correctly reported at trial. Id.
4" Id. at 473-74.
47 Id, at 444-45, 473-74.
" Id.
4 " Id. at 475.
5° Id.
" Id.
52
 Id., citing Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. .506, 516 (1962).
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the required warnings, the state is compelled to demonstrate the validity of a
claimed waiver as a prerequisite to the admission into evidence at trial of any
statement made by the accused in response to interrogation. 53
Moreover, in certain circumstances the state is foreclosed from asserting
and proving that a knowing and intelligent waiver was given. No waiver can
be shown where the incriminating statements resulted from police interroga-
tion not preceded by the required warnings," nor is the state permitted to
argue that a waiver was made merely because the suspect answered some in-
quiries before invoking the privilege. 55 Where a suspect Once invokes his
fifth amendment right, either by a request for an attorney or by an indication
of his intent to remain silent, any statement obtained through the failure of
police to discontinue questioning at that point is inadmissible as per se involun-
tary, and the state is precluded from curing the violation by arguing that
subsequently an effective waiver was given: "... any statement taken after the
person invokes the privilege can not be other than the product of compulsion,
subtle or otherwise. Without the right cut-off questioning, the setting of in-
custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in
producing a statement after the privilege has once been invoked." Where
the accused invokes his rights by a request for an attorney, Miranda forbids
renewed questioning until the suspect has had the opportunity to confer with
counsel, and counsel is present at the subsequent interrogation session. 57
Miranda left open the standard by which a "knowing and intelligent"
waiver would be measured, although the Court hinted that a "totality of the
circumstances" approach was envisioned." In North Carolina v. Butler" the
Court confirmed that an explicit waiver is not required by Miranda: "at least
in some cases waiver can be clearly inferred from the actions and words of the
person interrogated."" Under Miranda and North Carolina v. Butler the con-
cept of waiver of fifth amendment rights is well-developed. The state has the
53 Id. at 444, 476, 479. The Court noted that its prohibition was limited to state-
ments obtained through interrogation:
we do not purport to find all confessions inadmissible. Confessions remain
a proper clement in law enforcement. Any statement given freely and vol-
untarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evi-
dence. The fundamental import of the privilege while an individual is in
custody is not whether he is allowed to talk to the police without the ben-
efit of warnings and counsel, but whether he can be interrogated. ...
Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amend-
ment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding today.
Id. at 478,
51 Id. at 470. But see Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974). Although decided
on non-Miranda grounds, Tucker contained the suggestion that technical errors or
omissions in the giving of Miranda warnings may not require the exclusion from evi-
dence of resulting statements in the absence of wilful or negligent police conduct, Id.
446-47.
55 384 U.S. at 475-76 (1966).
" Id. at 474.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 475-77. But see Justice Harlan's dissent, which assumed that an express
waiver was required. ld. at 504, 516-17 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
5"
 441 U.S. 369 (1979).
"" Id. at '373 (footnote omitted).
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burden of proving on the totality of the circumstances that after the accused
was informed of his rights" he voluntarily waived them. 62 If the accused
either requests an attorney or "indicates in any manner, at any time" that he
does not wish to speak, however, any statement obtained thereafter through
police questioning is inadmissible as the product of compulsion. 63 In Michi-
gan v. Mosley," the Court modified this stance where a suspect has indicated
that he wishes to remain silent (as distinct from a request for an attorney 65 ) in
one interrogation session and another interrogation session is subsequently
held. Mosley held that the admissibility of statements obtained after the sus-
pect invokes his right to silence depends on whether his right to cut-off ques-
tioning was scrupulously honored." In that decision, however, the Court
implicitly reaffirmed the Miranda "irrebuttable presumption" 67 of compulsion
where in any given interrogation session incriminating statements are elicited
through questioning after invocation of the right to remain silent. In short,
within the context of a single interrogation session, once the suspect has indi-
cated "in any manner, at any time" 68 that he wishes to remain silent, it is not
open to the state to introduce these statements into evidence on the basis that
the suspect subsequently waived his rights if the alleged waiver occurs during
the same interrogation session and is the product of continued questioning
after the privilege has been invoked. Any statement obtained under these cir-
cumstances, including a statement of waiver, must be excluded from evidence
in the state's case-in-chieP 6 against the accused as involuntary and a per se
violation of Miranda."
' In the typical Miranda confession case, the giving of the warnings to the accused
is not in issue and is usually stipulated to at the accused's pre-trial motion to suppress
or at trial. The critical issue is the validity of the accused's waiver. See, e.g., United
States v. Frazier, 476 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
12 In practice, at trial or at the pre-trial motion to suppress, the accused must come
forward with sufficient evidencetof the involuntariness of his waiver to raise the issue.
The state then has the burden of proving, usually by a preponderance of the evidence,
that on the facts and circumstances surrounding the interrogation session the accused's
waiver was voluntarily given. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 486 (1972). See, e.g.,
SMITH, 30 MASS. PRACTICE: CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (West Stipp. 1979).
t' 3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966).
" 4
 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
"5 Id. at 101 n.7. The Court noted that the case did not involve a request to see an
attorney and stated that the procedures to be followed in that circumstance were de-
tailed in Miranda. Id.
"" Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975).
67 Id. at 114 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
68
 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966).
"6 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (statements obtained in violation of
Miranda may he used for impeachment purposes); accord, Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S.
714 (1975).
7" Because the Court in Miranda unequivocally articulated the procedures to be
followed upon a suspect's request for an attorney or statement of unwillingness to talk
and the consequences of failure to follow these mandated procedures, the claim that
the alleged waiver was ineffective because of an earlier express invocation should
rarely arise. Following from Miranda, however, were the accused to so contend, the
only issue in question, on which the state would bear the burden of proof, would be
whether the accused had made the alleged statement of invocation. Cy. Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966) (state establishes the circumstances under which
interrogation takes place and has the means to provide corroborating evidence, there-
fore state must prove accused waived his rights).
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In summary, the Court in Miranda created mandatory procedural
safeguards to ensure that any incriminating statement by an accused was
freely given. Although the Court recognized that a suspect might waive his
right to silence or to the presence of an attorney, it placed the burden on the
state to prove such a waiver and carefully delimited the circumstances under
which a valid waiver could be made. Subsequently, the Court made clear that
the test of whether a waiver has been knowingly and voluntarily given is based
on an examination of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the inter-
rogation. The concept of waiver under Miranda, therefore, has been the focus
of considerable attention, and consequent development, by the Court. Except
for the Court's statement in Miranda that the fifth amendment right can be
invoked either by a request for an attorney or by a suspect's indicating his
wish to remain silent, however, the Supreme Court has not developed the
aspect of invocation: the circumstances under which the fifth amendment pro-
tection will be deemed to have been invoked when an accused fails to ex-
pressly request an attorney or explicitly state that he does not wish to speak.
II. THE CALIFORNIA CASES AND THE CONCEPT OF INVOCATION
A. The California Supreme Court and the Early Cases on Invocation
In the absence of direction from the United States Supreme Court on the
parameters of the concept of invocation of the fifth amendment rights under
Miranda, the California Supreme Court focused its attention on the develop-
ment of that concept. in a line of cases which culminated in In re Michael C.
The court rested its conclusions on the premise that to require particular
conduct or a strict verbal formula to invoke the privilege would subvert the
prophylactic purpose of Miranda. 71
 People v. Fioritto 72 was the seminal case in
As will be developed in text at notes 199-200 infra, Miranda allows for the accused's
contention that as a factual matter he asserted the privilege (i.e., by words or conduct
which reasonably indicate an unwillingness to talk but which fall short of an express,
unambiguous statement) in a given interrogation session prior to the alleged waiver.
Procedurally, proof of this assertion parallels that of waiver. See note 62 supra. The
accused would have the burden of coming forward with sufficient evidence to raise the
issue of assertion: he would have to satisfy the court that it is as likely as not that the
words or conduct in question demonstrated his intent to remain silent. Having done
so, the state should then have the burden of proving that the accused's words or con-
duct were not indicative of his intent to remain silent. The state's failure to meet this
burden would render the alleged waiver invalid and the statements would be excluded
from evidence.
71 See, e.g., People v. Randall, I Cal. 3d 948, 955, 464 P.2d 114, 118, 83 Cal. Rptr.
658, 662 (1970):
a suspect may indicate that he wishes to invoke the privilege by means
other than an express statement to that effect; no particular form of words
or conduct is necessary.
To strictly limit the manner in which a suspect may assert the privilege,
or to demand that it be invoked with unmistakable clarity (resolving any
ambiguity against the defendant) would subvert Miranda's prophylactic in-
tent. Moreover, it would benefit, if anyone, only the experienced crimi-
nal.... Conversely, it would operate most severely on the ignorant and
unsophisticated suspect who is most susceptible to the compulsion arising
from the tactics of custodial interrogation.
Id. (footnote omitted).
22 68 Cal. 2d 714, 441 P.2d 625, 68 Cal. Rptr. 817.
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the line of California decisions. In Fioritto, the accused and two accomplices
were apprehended for burglary. 73 At the police station, after having been
informed of his rights under Miranda, the accused refused the police request
that he sign a form waiving those rights." Immediately thereafter the police
confronted him with his two accomplices who already had confessed and had
implicated him." In the presence of the police officers the accused and one
of the accomplices got into a heated argument. 7 " The police then again in-
formed the accused of his rights and again asked him to sign the waiver form
and confess. 77 The accused did so. 78 Citing Miranda, the California Su-
preme Court held that the accused's confession had been obtained in violation
of his rights. 7 " The court reasoned that the accused, by his initial refusal to
waive his rights, had indicated that he intended to assert those rights." After
the defendant. thereby invoked the privilege, all further attempts at interroga-
tion should have ceased."' Consequently, the confession, secured in violation
of Miranda, was inadmissible." In explaining the limits of its decision, the
court noted that volunteered statements, those statements initiated by a sus-
pect after his invocation of his rights, were unaffected by its holding; only
those statements which resulted from police-initiated discussion after an invo-
cation of the privilege were prohibited." The Court observed that in deter-
mining whether the proscriptions of Miranda had been violated, "the form of
the renewed inquiries, however subtle or gentle" could not be considered."
Fioritto was followed by People v. Ireland. 85 In Ireland, the accused, ar-
rested for murder, 81' was advised of his Miranda rights on the way to the
police car prior to being transported to the station house."' At that time he
stated, "Call my parents for my attorney."'" The officers made no response
73 Id. at 716 - 17. 441 P.2d at 626, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
74 hi.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id .
79 Id. at 718-19, 441 P.2d at 627, 68 Cal. Rpt.r. at 819, citing Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966).
8° 68 Cal. 2d at 718-19, 441 P.2d at 627, 68 Cal. Rpm at 819.
81 id
82 Id.
83 Id. at. 719-20, 441 P.2d at 627-28, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 819-20. As the Fioritto court.
noted, voluntary statements are expressly authorized by Miranda: "There is no re-
quirement that police stop a person who enters a police station to conkss to a crime,
or a person who calls the police to offer a confession or any other statement he wishes
to make. Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amend-
ment." Id., quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966). Thus, voluntary
statements are not included within the protections of Miranda. Such statements, how-
ever, arc distinguished from those which result through continued questioning either
after invocation of the privilege or after a waiver which is later determined to have
been ineffective. In these latter cases, none of the resulting statements are voluntary
under a Miranda analysis.
84 Id. at 720, 441 1'.2d at 628. 68 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
85 70 Cal. 2d 522, 450 P.2d 580, 75 Cal. Rptr. 188 (1969).
" Id. at 525, 532, 450 P.2d at 581, 586, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 189, 194.
87 Id. at 532-33, 450 P.2d at 586, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 194.
88 Id.
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and did not communicate the request to superior officers.'" Shortly after his
arrival at the station house, Ireland was again advised of his rights and was
asked by the interrogating officer to talk, whereupon he confessed." The
California Supreme Court held that Ireland's statement en route to the station
house constituted a request for an attorney.•' In rejecting the state's argu-
ment that Ireland's statements had been made voluntarily and were therefore
admissible, the court reaffirmed that a defendant in custody might make
statements admissible under Miranda if it were shown that they were the re-
sult of the defendant's own initiative and did not arise from custodial interro-
gation."2
 Here, however, it noted, the confession had resulted from direct
questions by the police officer after Ireland's invocation." The confession,
therefore, was inadmissible."
The evolution of the concept of invocation by the California Supreme
Court continued with People v. Randall." Randall was arrested"' in his
apartment and there advised of his rights."' Upon his arrival at the station
house, in accordance with police procedure, he was allowed to make two tele-
phone calls."' In the presence of and to the knowledge of police officers,"
Randall placed one of the telephone calls to his attorney."'" He was sub-
sequently questioned by the police.'" Later police learned of an outstanding
and unrelated arrest warrant for robbery against Randall. 102
 Randall was
again informed of his Miranda rights and in response to police questioning
confessed to the robbery.'" On appeal to the California Supreme Court the
state argued that a telephone call to an attorney should not be interpreted as
equivalent to the request for an attorney in Ireland or to the refusal to sign a
waiver form in Fiorillo because such a call in no way signified a desire not to
talk with the police or to have an attorney present.'" The court rejected this
argument, observing that the state had presented no sensible distinction" 1 " 5
between the actions of those defendants and that of Randall. The court con-
cluded that in each case the suspect had demonstrated conduct which reason-
ably appeared inconsistent with a desire to speak freely and completely with
the police at that time.'"
89 Id .
'° Id. at 533-34, 450 P.2d at 586-87, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 194-95.
" 1 Id. 536, 450 P.2d at 588. 75 Cal. Rptr. at 196.
"2 Id. at 536-37, 450 P.2c1 at 588-89, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 196-97.
"3
 Id. at 537, 450 P.2d al 588-89, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 196-97.
"4 Id. See note 83 supra distinguishing voluntary statements and statements which
result from continued questioning after initial invocation of the privilege.
"' 1 Cal. 3d 948, 464 P.2d 114, 83 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1970).
"a
 The opinion is unclear as to the reason for his arrest.
" 7 1 Cal. 3d at 951, 464 P.2d al 115-16, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 659-60.
98 Id. at 952, 464 P.2d at 116, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 660.
9 "	 at 952, 953, 464 11.2d at 116, 117, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 660, 661.
"" Id. at 952 n.4, 953, 464 P.2d at 116 n.4, 117, 83 Cal. Rpt.r. at 660 n.4, 661.
1 " Id. at 952-53, 464 P.2c1 at 116, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 660.
" 2 Id. at 952, 464 P.2d at 116, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 660.
103 Id. at 952, 953, 464 P.2d at 116, 117, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 660, 661.
114
 Id. at 955-56, 464 P.2d at 118-19, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 662-63.
'" Id. at 956-57, 464 P.2d at 118-19, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 663-64.
1011 Id. at 956, 464 P.2d at 118, 83 Cal. Rptr. at. 663.
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Acknowledging the possibility that a suspect's call to his attorney might be
indicative of something other than his intent to invoke the privilege, the court
concluded that, nonetheless, it was unwilling to presume that a call to an at-
torney was not an indication of the intent to invoke the privilege.'" Accord-
ingly, it held:
When as appears here, the suspect to the knowledge of the police
completes a call to his attorney, the People—if they contend that the
fact of such a call should not be considered an invocation of the
privilege—must affirmatively demonstrate that the suspect was not thereby
indicating a desire to remain silent until he obtained the full advice of
counsel.'"
Finding that the state had not attempted to meet this burden and that the
questioning of Randall had not ended as required by Miranda, the court held
the confession inadmissible." In a footnote,"° the court stressed that its
holding applied only to statements obtained through continued interrogation
after assertion of the privilege and not to statements later volunteered by the
suspect.
People v. Burton"' was the fourth case in the line which had developed
from People v. Fioritto. Burton was a sixteen year old minor when arrested for
murder and assault with the intent to commit murder.'" At the station
house, prior to being advised of his rights, Burton asked to see his par-
107 Id. at 956-57, 464 P.2d at 118-20, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 663-64.
108
 Id. at 957, 464 P.2d at 120, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 664 (emphasis added).
' 19 Id. at 957, 464 P.2d at. 120, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 664.
1 " Id. at 956 n.7, 464 P.2d at 119 n.7, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 663 n.7:
It (conduct which appears reasonably inconsistent with a present willing-
ness to talk to the police at that time] is, of course, not inconsistent with
either of two divergent subsequent occurences: 1) a change of mind on the
part of the defendant prompted by the advice of counsel, his own
psychological make-up, or similar facts; or 2) a change of mind prompted
by continued interrogation and efforts to convince the defendant to com-
municate with the officers. The former is not prescribed [sic] by Miranda
[sic], nor by our application of its teaching in Fioritto and Ireland. 'The
fundamental import of the privilege while an individual is in custody is not
whether he is allowed to talk to the police without the benefit of warnings
or counsel, but whether he can be interrogated.... Volunteered statements
of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility
is not affected by our holding today.' ... 'Not only did we affirm our
adherence to this principle in the Fioritto case, but we also there indicated
that even a defendant in custody might make statements admissible under
Miranda if it were shown that such statements were the result of the defen-
dant's own initiative and did not arise in the context of custodial interroga-
tion.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
E" 6 Cal. 3d 375, 491 P.2d 793, 99 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971).
12 Id. at 378, 491 P.2d at 795, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 2. Burton was arrested on two
charges of murder and on assault with intent to commit murder. Id.
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ents. 13 The request was refused. 14 Immediately thereafter the police
explained the Miranda rights to him." 5 Burton stated that he understood his
rights, waived them and made a full confession." 6 Relying on its reasoning
in Randall, the court disputed the state's contention that a minor's request for
a parent could be made for many reasons and therefore should not be con-
strued as an invocation of the privilege." 7 The court suggested that it would
be most likely and normal that a juvenile in custody would express his desire
for help and his unwillingness to talk with the police without such help by a
request to see one of his parents."" The court therefore held that a minor's
request for one of his parents at any time prior to or during interrogation was
to be construed as indicating that. the minor intended to invoke his fifth
amendment privilege unless the state presented evidence compelling a con-
trary conclusion.'" Finding that the state had not met its burden and that
questioning had continued after Burton had invoked the privilege, the court
held that Burton's confession should have been excluded from evidence and
reversed.'"
With the decisions in Randall and Burton, the California Supreme Court .
had developed the concept of invocation to include in two types of factual
situations—a telephone call to an attorney and a minor's request for his
parents—a burden-shifting approach to the issue of invocation."' If a sus-
pect demonstrated either of the two behaviors, a presumption arose that he
thereby was indicating his intent to remain silent. In order for any statement
which resulted from continued or renewed police questioning thereafter to be
13 Id. Burton's father was at the station house at the time Burton made his request.
Burton's father had also asked to see his son and was refused. Id.
1 " Id. at 379, 380, 491 P.2d at 795, 796, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 3, 4.
"5 Id. at 381, 491 P.2d at 796, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 4.
"6 Id. The juvenile confessed on three separate occasions. Id.
'" Id. at 383, 491 P.2d at 798, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 6, citing People v. Randall, 1 Cal. 3d
948, 957, 464 P.2d 114, 120, 83 Cal. Rptr. 658, 664 (1970).
"R 6 Cal. 3d at 382-83, 491 P.2d at 798, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
" 9 Id. at 383-84, 491 P.2d at 798, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
12D Id,
121 Compare California's approach to determining if a suspect had invoked the
privilege to that which would normally exist under Miranda in determining invocation
as a factual matter. See note 70 supra. Normally under Miranda, a suspect would raise
the issue of invocation by demonstrating that, on all the facts and circumstances, his
behavior and/or statements were indicative of his intent to invoke the privilege. Having
so raised the issue, the state would then be called upon to prove, also using all relevant
facts and circumstances, that whatever the purpose of the behavior or statements, it
was not a manifestation of his intent to invoke the privilege. (Note also the similarity in
approach between an analysis of invocation as a fact question and the analysis involved
in determining waiver, see text at notes 206-08 infra.) The California court, by con-
trast, allows the accused to meet his burden by showing either that he placed a tele-
phone call to his attorney to the knowledge of the police or that he was a minor and
requested his parents. Thus, in either of these circumstances, the accused is enabled to
raise the issue of invocation as a factual matter by relying on one fact out of the
universe of facts or circumstances by which a suspect would normally raise the issue.
By demonstrating the one fact, the state's responsibility to meet its burden of proof is
triggered.
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admissible in evidence,' 22
 the state was called upon to prove that the suspect's
behavior—the telephone call or the minor's request—was not a manifestation
of his intent to invoke the privilege. The California Supreme Court, however,
had repeatedly underscored that any statements volunteered by a suspect
even after initial invocation of the privilege were not encompassed by its deci-
sions and were admissible in evidence. It was against this backdrop that In re
Michael C. was decided.
B. The California Supreme Court and In re Michael C.
In reaching its decision in In re Michael C., the California Supreme Court
relied on its decisions in Randall and Burton, and extended the holding of the
latter by analogy.'" On the basis of the emphasis which the California
juvenile court places on a close relationship between a minor and his proba-
tion officer' 24
 and Michael C.'s probation officer's instructions that Michael C.
contact him immediately in the event of any trouble, 125 the court concluded
that Michael C.'s request for his probation officer was a "call for help" 1213 aki n
to that in the Burton juvenile's request for his parents. 127
 Accordingly, the
court held that the People must meet the burden of proving that a minor
who requests to see his probation officer does not intend to assert. his Fifth
Amendment privilege." 128
 On the facts the court held that the state had not
met its burden and therefore found that Michael C.'s statements and sketches,
as the product of continued questioning after invocation of the privilege, were
inadmissible in evidence against him.' 2 " The court rejected the state's conten-
tion that a minor's request for his probation officer could he distinguished
from a request for a parent because a probation officer represents "an arm of
the prosecutorial system" and could not, therefore, provide the counsel and
protection of a parent.' 3" The court countered this claim, stating that, not-
122 In People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 113, 545 P.2d 272, 280, 127 Cal. Rptr.
360, 368 (1976), California rejected on state constitutional grounds the application in
state criminal ,
 proceedings of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), which held that statements obtained in violation of Miranda
may be used for impeachment purposes if the accused elects to testify in his own
behalf'. Similarly, in People v. Petting-ill, 21 Cal. 3d 231, 246, 578 P.2d 108, 117, 145
Cal. Rptr. 861, 870 (1978), the California Supreme Court rejected the application in
state criminal proceedings of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Michigan v. Mosley,
423 U.S. 96 (1975) ("circumstances of the renewed interrogation" test), by resting
People v. Fioritto, 68 Cal. 2d 714, 441 P.2d 625, 68 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1968) (interroga-
tion may not be renewed until counsel is present) on state constitutional grounds.
12"
 21 Cal. 3d at 476, 579 13 ,2(1 at 10, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 361. The California court's
decisions in both Burton and Michael C. were ambiguous with regard to whether the
respective behaviors were analyzed under the Miranda request for an attorney means
for invoking the privilege or the "indication in any manner of the wish to remain
silent" means.
124 Id. at 476, 579 P.2d at 9, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 361.
125 Id:
12" Id. at 476, 579 P.2d at 10, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 361. •
127 Id. at 478, 579 P.2c1 at 11, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
1211 Id .
129 Id.
' 3 " Id. at 476, 579 P.2d at 10, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 361.
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withstanding a probation officer's status as a peace officer, he was frequently
the person to whom a minor would turn for advice and assistance."'
Moreover, the court noted, "Mhen Michael C. asked to sec his probation
officer, he was not seeking to confide in a prosecutor." ' 32
 The state's second
claim that, should the Burton decision be extended to include a request for a
probation officer, the court could not reasonably distinguish a minor's request
for any adult 133 also was dismissed. Such a distinction, the court retorted, was
easily made. A probation officer is charged by statute to represent the in-
terests of and to advise and care for the juvenile.' 34
 The slate's final argu-
ment, relying on precedent, was that whether a juvenile had the capacity to
understand and waive the Miranda rights was a question of fact. 135 The state
contended that on the facts Michael C. possessed the requisite capacity and his
confession was, therefore, voluntary and admissible.' 3 " The court, rejecting
this argument, responded that at issue in the instant case was whether when
Michael C. asked for his probation officer he had invoked his fifth amend-
ment privilege, not whether he had the capacity to waive it." 7 Finding that
the state had not met its burden of disproving Michael C.'s intention to invoke
the privilege by his request for his probation officer, the court held that
Michael C.'s confession should have been excluded from evidence and re-
versed.'"
There was language in the opinion, however, in which the court ap-
peared to hold, in contradiction to the factual inquiry just discussed, that a
minor's request for his probation officer per se invoked his rights under
Miranda. 13" The court appeared to suggest that it viewed such a request, like
the request for an attorney under Miranda, as sufficient without more to trig-
ger the Miranda proscription against continued questioning.'" These two
131 Id.
132 Id.
"a Id. at 477, 579 P.2d at 10, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 361.
134 Id.
133 Id., citing People v. Lara, 67 Cal. 2d 365, 432 P.2d 202. 62 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1967):
In re Dennis M., 70 Cal. 2d 444, 450 P.2d 296, 75 Cal. Rptr. I (1969).
13'1 21 Cal. 3d at 477, 597 P.2d at 10, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 361-62,[37. Id .
138 Id. at 478, 579 P.2d at 11, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
' 39
 hi. at 477, 579 P.2d at 10-11, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 362. The court stated:
In cases in which we must decide. whether a confession is voluntary or
coerced we have looked to the 'totality of the circumstances' to find
whether the confessant was capable of understanding the interrogation and
voluntarily confessed or whether his will was actually overcome. Here, how-
ever, we face conduct which, regardless of considerations of capacity, coercion or
voluntariness, per se invokes the privilege against self-incrimination. Thus our
question turns not on whether the defendant had the ability, capacity or
willingness to give a knowledgeable waiver, and hence whether he acted
voluntarily, but whether, when he called for his probation officer, he exer-
cised his Fifth Amendment privilege. We hold that in doing so he no less in-
voked the protection against self-incrimination than if he had asked for an attorney.
Id. (emphasis added).
140
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statements of the court's holding raised immediate question as to whether the
decision rested on a factual inquiry or a per se rule.
Justice Clark, in the case's only dissent, underscored the confusion in the
majority's opinion created by the two contradictory statements of the hold-
ing."' Because of this confusion, Clark believed it necessary to emphasize
that what was in issue was not the simple fact of the request but rather
whether that request was intended as an invocation of the privilege.'" Clark
stressed that this determination was one of fact, to be resolved on the totality
of the circumstances. 143 On the facts he disagreed with the majority, conclud-
ing that Michael C.'s request was not an indication of his unwillingness to
proceed with the interrogation and, further, that Michael C. had voluntarily
waived his rights." 4
 It was with this patent ambiguity as to its holding—
whether Michael C. had as a factual matter invoked the privilege by his re-
quest for his probation officer or whether a minor's request for his probation
officer was deemed a per se invocation of the privilege (thereby extending
Miranda)—that In re Michael C. reached the United States Supreme Court.
III. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND FARE V. MICHAEL C.
A. The Majority Opinion
Given the ambiguity as to the precise nature of the California Supreme
Court's holding, the United States Supreme Court in Fare v. Michael C. first
had to resolve whether the California court had found as a matter of fact that
Michael C. had invoked the privilege or whether it had extended the per se
invocation rules of Miranda by holding that a minor's request for his proba-
tion officer during custodial interrogation was in all cases to be considered an
invocation of the privilege." 5
 It then considered whether a probation officer
possessed skills, abilities and status, vis-a-vis the juvenile in custody and the
criminal justice system, sufficiently similar to those possessed by an attorney
such that an extension of the Miranda per se rule with respect to the request
for an attorney was warranted.'" Finally, it turned to whether Michael C.
had knowingly and intelligently waived his rights.' 47
 The Court determined
that a per se rule had been established; '" that a probation officer is unable to
serve a juvenile in the same way as an attorney so that no justification for an
extension of the per se rules of Miranda exists; "9
 and, on the facts, Michael
C.'s waiver had been knowingly and intelligently made.' 3 "
In determining that the California Supreme Court had held that a
minor's request for his probation officer was a per se invocation of his fifth
14 ' Id. at 480-81, 579 P.2d at 12-13, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 363-64. Justice Clark was
joined in his dissent by Justice Manuel.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 481. 579 P.2d at l3, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
1441 Id.
' 43 442 U.S. at 714, 715-16 n.3.
' 4" Id. at 719-22.
147 Id. at 724-27.
' 4 " Id. at 715-16 n.3.
14 " Id. at 722.
"" Id. at 727.
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amendment rights, the United States Supreme Court found two factors con-
clusive. The first factor was the "strong per se language" ' 5 ' in the California
opinion. The second factor was a footnote in Randall' S2
 which the Court con-
strued as creating a per se rule.' 53 In reaching this interpretation the Su-
preme Court noted that the Randall footnote stated that even though a suspect
might have invoked the privilege, it might be possible that subsequent volun-
tary statements, not prompted by interrogation, would be admissible if the
state could show that. they were the product of the suspect's voluntary decision
to waive the rights he had earlier invoked.' 54 The Court interpreted this
footnote to mean that the state had no opportunity to dispute that the suspect
intended by the words or conduct at issue to invoke the privilege but only the
opportunity to prove that after the per se invocation of the privilege the sus-
pect . made a voluntary decision to abandon the rights which he had earlier
asserted and to volunteer statements. The Supreme Court reasoned from this
interpretation and the per se language in the instant case that the state could
have negated the per se effect of Michael C.'s request only by showing that he
later voluntarily decided to waive those rights and volunteer statements.' 55
The Supreme Court therefore concluded that any ambiguity in the opinion
had to be resolved in favor of a determination that the California Supreme
Court had held that a minor's request. to see his probation officer per se in-
voked his fifth amendment privilege under Miranda. 1 '"
The Court next characterized the California court's holding as being
based on the view that a probation officer would act to protect the juvenile's
interests in the same way as would an attorney.' 57 It therefore turned its
attention to the rationale for the per se rule announced in Miranda with re-
spect to the request for an attorney.•" The Court explained that that rule
was rooted in the unique role a lawyer performs in the legal system."" He is
a trained advocate, with special ability to aid an accused in preserving his fifth
amendment rights; his presence serves to guard against police overreaching
and ensures that any statements made are accurately reported; he has the
power to act on behalf of his client; and, communication between him and his
client is privileged."'" In sum, the attorney is the one I.() whom society looks
for the protection of legal rights.'" A probation officer, on the other hand,
lacks these skills and attributes with regard both to the accused and to the
Id. at 715-16 n.3.
' 52 I Cal. 3d at 956 n.7, 164 l'.2d at 119 n.7, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 663 n.7.
'' 442 U.S. at 715-16 11.3. See note I H) supra,
154 Id.
156 hi.
'" hi. at 714. See text at notes 123-27 and note 123 supra. The California opinion is
ambiguous in this regard, although there is some support in the opinion for this
characterization. See In re Michael C., 21 Cal. 3d at 475-76, 579 P.2d at. 9-10, 146 Cal.
Rptr. at 360-61 (1978).
1 " 442 U.S. at 719-23.
13" Id. at 719.
1.60
nil id.
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legal system." 2
 Moreover, the Court reasoned, as a peace officer and
employee of the state which seeks to prosecute the accused, a probation of-
ficer's loyalties are necessarily divided; he can not simultaneously be counselor
to the youth and officer of the state. 1 fi" Conceding the existence of the pro-
bation officer's statutory duty to protect the juvenile's interests 164
 and the pos-
sibility of a relationship of trust between a minor and his probation officer.'"
the Court nevertheless deemed a probation officer ill-equipped to fulfill the
"pivotal role of legal counsel that justifies the per se rule established in
Miranda.. .."'"° It therefore concluded that a juvenile's request for his pro-
bation officer is not sufficiently similar to a request for an attorney under
Miranda to support an extension of the Miranda per se rule.'"
The Court then considered whether the request for a probation officer,
apart from any analogy to the request for counsel, should be treated as a per
se invocation of the right to silence." 8
 It. dismissed this idea, observing that
there is nothing inherent in the request which compels this conclusion.'" In
some circumstances, the Court asserted, a minor's request for his probation
officer might be consistent. with a desire to speak to the police.' 71)
 Declining
to find in the request a per Se invocation of the right to remain silent, it
suggested that courts might take into account such a request in evaluating
whether a juvenile, in fact, had waived his rights.' 7]
Finally, the Court reaffirmed the Miranda "totality of the circumstances"
approach to the determination of waiver as providing sufficient protection for
juveniles, and affirmed the juvenile court's finding that Michael C. had effec-
tively,
 waived his rights.' 7 = The Court stated that he had been informed of
his rights; the police had ensured that he understood them; his rights were
"2 Id.
' 3 Id. at 720-22. As an example, the Court noted that a probation officer is gener-
ally required to report to the state any wrongdoing by the juvenile even where he
learns of the wrongdoing from the juvenile himself. Id. at 720. The Court also noted
that it was Michael C.'s probation officer who had filed the petition to have him ad-
judged a ward of the court and that it was the acting chief of probation for the state
who was the petitioner in the case. hl. The Court recognised that by the time it de-
cided Fare v. Michael C., the California statutory provision, CAL. WEEP. & NSt'. CODE
ANN. § 65t) (West 1972), had been amended to require that the prosecuting attorney.
not a probation officer, file the petition to have a juvenile adjudged a ward of the
court. 442. U.S. at 720 n.5. It dismissed this change of circumstances, however, as only
one factor in its analysis. Id.
'" Id. at 722. The Court rejected the distinction which the California Supreme
Court. had drawn between probation officers and others on the basis of the
statutorily-created relationship/see In re Michael C., 21 Cal. 3d at 477, 579 P.2d at 10,
146 Cal. Rptr. at 361, observing that the state could expand the class of persons in-
cluded simply by creating such a statutory duty 10 care. hi. at 723.
1 " 5
 442 U.S. at 722.
"' Id.
117 Id. at 722-23.
Id. at 723-24.
'" Id. at 724.
' 7 ° Id.
' 71 Id. at 724, 725.
172 Id. at 725.
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again explained to him after the denial of his request for his probation of-
ficer; he clearly expressed his willingness to waive his rights, and nothing in-
dicated that he lacked the capacity to comprehend the nature of his actions.'"
The Court concluded, therefore, that the admission of the incriminating
materials against Michael C. in the juvenile court proceedings had been cor-
rect.'"
In summary, the Court found that because a probation officer cannot
offer the legal assistance needed to protect the fifth amendment rights of an
accused in custody, and because of the handicaps which his position in the
juvenile court system pose to his serving as a protector of the rights of
juveniles, a request by a minor for his probation officer cannot per se consti-
tute a request to remain silent. In addition, on the basis of the record, the
Court concluded that Michael C. had effectively waived his right to remain
silent.
B. The Dissents
Citing the Court's historical recognition of and concern for the increased
coercive impact of custodial interrogation on juveniles,'" Justice Marshall,
joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens,'" argued that Miranda must he con-
strued broadly where juveniles are concerned to accomplish its purpose of
dispelling the compulsion inherent' in custodial interrogation.'" He con-
, tended that Miranda requires that interrogation cease whenever a juvenile re-
quests any adult obligated to protect his interests:" Such a request, he
reasoned, is both an attempt to obtain advice and a general invocation of the
right to silence, and is clearly inconsistent with a present desire to speak
freely."" He noted that requiring a "strict verbal formula" to invoke the
privilege would protect only the knowledgeable, while "abandoning the young
person who knows no more than to ask for the ... person he trusts." " 5
Justice Marshall concluded that on his reading of Miranda a juvenile's request
for his probation officer should be treated as a per se invocation of his fifth
amendment rights."'
"3
 hi. at 726-27.
'" Id. at 728.
"3 Id. at 729, citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S.
49 (1962); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
' 76 442 U.S. at 728-32.
"7 Id. at 729.
178 hi. at 729-30.
17" hi. at 730.
' 8 " hi., citing Chancy v. Wainwright, 561 F.2d 1129, 1134 (5th Cir. 1977) (Goldberg,
J., dissenting).
181 442 U.S. at 730. Justice Marshall also took issue with the majority's view that the
law enforcement duties of a probation officer would inhibit his ability to aid the
juvenile in light of the California Supreme Court's express determination that these
duties presented no significant. obstacle. Id. at 731. He disagreed with the majority's
"speculation" that probation officers must cooperate with the police, pointing out that.
Michael C.'s probation officer had instructed all his charges not to go and admit
openly to an offense, [but rather] to get some type of advice from ... parents Or a
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In a separate dissent,'" Justice Powell agreed with the majority that the
per se rules of Miranda do not encompass a juvenile's request for his probation
officer, but disagreed with its finding that Michael C. had waived his rights
voluntarily. 183 Citing the same earlier Supreme Court cases involving
juveniles on which the Justice Marshall dissent relied', he stated that the Court
had repeatedly, stressed that "the greatest care" must be taken to ensure that
a juvenile's confession is voluntary.'" Referring to the appellate record, he
characterized Michael C., as "immature, emotional and uneducated" and
noted the Michael C. was crying during much of the interrogation session.'"
He suggested that Michael C., because of these factors, was most likely to be
particularly vulnerable to the type of "skillful, two-on-one, repetitive style of
interrogation to which he was subjected."'" Justice Powell contended that
Michael C.'s twice-repeated response of "How I Know you guys won't pull no
police officer in and tell me he's an attorney?" when informed of his right to
the presence of an attorney demonstrated Michael C.'s "limited understand-
ing."'" He noted, moreover, that Michael C.'s request for his probation of-
ficer occurred during this part of the interrogation.'" Finally, he argued that
despite Michael C.'s repeated denials of involvement in the murder under
investigation, the police persisted in questioning him in the absence of counsel
until they finally obtained a confession.' 89
 Justice Powell concluded that the
police had not taken the required "greatest care" to ensure that Michael C.'s
confession was voluntary.' 9" He therefore would have affirmed the Califor-
nia Supreme Court's judgment.'"
IV. THE MIRANDA MANDATE: INVOCATION OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
AS A QUESTION OF FACT
The Supreme Court's reading of the California decision in Michael C. as
having created a per se rule of invocation is not well-founded. The better in-
terpretation of the California court's decision is that it created a rebuttable
presumption approach to whether a minor by his request for his probation
officer was demonstrating his intent to remain silent. This erroneous interpre-
tation, however, is not the most serious problem in the opinion. The more
critical flaw in the Supreme Court's opinion is the Court's failure to explore
invocation of the privilege as a factual matter under Miranda. It will be ar-
gued that. Miranda mandates such an inquiry and that such an inquiry is de-
sirable.
lawyer." Id. at. 731-32. In light of these facts, Marshall argued that at the very least a
California juvenile's request for his probation officer should be deemed a per se invoca-
tion. Id. at 730. 732.
"2 Id. at 732-34.
"" /d. at 732-34.
1 " Id. at 732-33. See cases cited at note 175 supra.
"5 Id. at 733. 733 n.2.
' 8 ' hl. at 733.
1 " 7 Id.
1 " Id. at 734.
' "t' Id.
Jim Id.
011 Id.
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It is unfortunate that the United States Supreme Court interpreted the
California decision as establishing a per se rule. Because of the questions about
invocation of the privilege as a factual matter which arise from Michael C. and
which remain unanswered, it would have been preferable for the Court to
address these issues. Had the Court correctly interpreted the California deci-
sion as creating a presumption, a clear statement from the Court on whether
and why an explicit invocation of the right to remain silent is necessary to
compel the termination of custodial questioning under Miranda might have
resulted.
The California Supreme Court's contribution to the current uncertainty
regarding the United States Supreme Court's attitude toward the question of
invocation as a factual matter cannot be underestimated. As noted earlier,'" 2 it
appeared to hold in one paragraph that a minor's request for his probation
officer was a per se invocation of his rights under Miranda. In the succeeding
paragraph, however, it held that the state had the burden of proving that a
minor's request for his probation officer was not indicative of his intent to
invoke the fifth amendment privilege and that the state had failed to meet its
burden. These alternative statements of the holding are fundamentally ir-
reconcilable: if a per se rule were created, it would not be open to the state to
rebut the inference of intention to invoke the privilege. Although the Su-
preme Court's determination that a per se rule, and, therefore, an extension of
Miranda, had been created finds obvious support in the California decision, its
weakness lies in that it fails to give effect to the rest of the opinion and, in
particular, to the other, contradictory, statement of the holding. In addition,
such an interpretation is inconsistent with the holdings in Randall and Burton,
from which Michael C. evolved and on which it expressly relied.'" 3
The first problem with the interpretation of the California decision as
adopting a per se rule is that it completely ignores the language in the Califor-
nia opinion, also denominated as its holding, which states that the state must
meet the burden of proving that a minor who requests to see his probation
officer does not intend to invoke his filth amendment privilege' "; and,
further, that in the instant case the state had failed to meet that burden.' 5
There is an explanation for the per se language in the California decision
which is not dependent. on a reading that a per se rule was created. The per se
language appears at. the point. in the opinion wherein the California Supreme
Court was responding to the state's contention that a juvenile's capacity to
waive his rights is to be determined on the totality of the circumstances and,
using that test, the juvenile court had correctly found that. Michael C.'s waiver
had been made voluntarily.'" The California court in using the per se lan-
guage was observing that the issue of' a juvenile's capacity to give an effective
waiver was inapposite to the decision at hand. The court had found that
"" See text at notes 128-20, 130-40 b note 139 supra.
In re Michael C.. 21 Cal. 3d 471, 475-76, 477, 579 P.2d 7, 10-11, 146 Cal. Rptr.
358, 360-61, 362.
"4 ht. at 478, 570 P.2d at II, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
19,-, hi.
1 "" ht. at 477, 579 P.24 at 10-11, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
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Michael C. had successfully invoked the privilege under Miranda, and there-
fore the state was precluded from arguing that he subsequently had waived
his rights because the "waiver" had been obtained within the same interroga-
tion session and through continued questioning after the invocation of the
privilege. This analysis would explain the California court's use of the per se
language. Because the court had decided on the facts of the case that Michael
C., by his request for his probation officer, had invoked the fifth amendment
privilege no less than if he had expressly requested an attorney under
Miranda, the issue of Michael C.'s capacity to give a knowing and intelligent
waiver in the circumstances was irrelevant. Second, as discussed earlier,'" in
Randall and Burton the California Supreme Court had held that a telephone
call to an attorney and a minor's request for his parents give rise to a pre-
sumption that the accused was thereby indicating his intent to remain silent.
In order for any statement thereafter obtained through police questioning to
be admissible the state is required to prove that the suspect's behavior was not
a manifestation of an intent to invoke the privilege. The interpretation of the
California court decision in Michael C. as adopting a per se rule is therefore
inconsistent with the California Supreme Court's decisions in those earlier
cases in which it created a rebuttable presumption approach to the issue of
invocation of the privilege under Miranda. Finally, as the Supreme Court
opinion conceded, Michael C. argued that the California court had not estab-
lished a per se rule but had held that on the facts Michael C. had invoked his
rights. 198 It cannot be said, therefore, that the alternative to a view that a per
se rule was created was not squarely before the Court.
In summary, an evaluation of that portion of the opinion in which the per
se language appears, the cases in the line of California cases which preceded
Michael C., and the argument. before the Supreme Court. that the California
court did not create a per se rule suggest that the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion that a per se rule had been created is not sound. The alternative
interpretation—that the California decision held that a minor's request for his
probation officer is by itself sufficient to raise a presumption of his intention
to invoke the privilege—avoids the weaknesses to which the per se interpreta-
tion is subject. Such an interpretation is compatible with the use of the per se
language in the California opinion and allows for effect to be given to that
language in the manner suggested above. Moreover, this interpretation is con-
sistent with the earlier decisions in Randall and Burton. For these reasons it is
submitted that the sounder interpretation of the California opinion in Michael
C. is that a rebuttable presumption approach—a factual analysis—was
adopted.
The Supreme Court's arguably incorrect determination that a per se rule
had been created facilitated, but did not mandate the primary weakness with
the Supreme Court's opinion—the Court turned directly from a discussion of
the per se issues to whether Michael C. had effectively waived his rights, omit-
ting consideration of whether Michael C. had invoked the privilege as a mat-
ter of fact.
" 7 See text and notes at 121-22 supra.
"A 442 U.S. 715-16 n.3,
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Miranda, it may be recalled, provides that the privilege may be invoked
either by a request for an attorney or by an indication in any manner at any
time of a desire to remain silent.'" The language by which the latter means
of invoking the privilege may be made is expansive and open-ended. It per-
mits and may even mandate a factual inquiry into whether a suspect invoked
his rights during custodial interrogation where his statements or conduct may
be reasonably indicative of such intent but fall short of an express indication
of unwillingness to speak. 2 " That state criminal proceedings were involved
poses no obstacle to consideration of this issue because interpretation of a
federal constitutional law is involved. 20 ' Therefore, no legal impediments
prevented the Court. from considering whether Michael C. had in fact in-
voked his rights. 2 ° 2
To date, few courts, state or federal, have entertained this issue.'"
Three factors may combine and contribute to this myopia. First, Miranda em-
phasized the required warnings and a valid waiver as prerequisites to the ad-
missibility of self-incriminating statements against the accused. 2 " Although
the case established per se rules, it failed to address invocation of the right as a
factual matter beyond its broad statement that the right. to silence could be
invoked in any manner. Second, although invocation of the right and waiver
are conceptually distinct, they are temporally linked. At the point where an
accused is waiving his right, he is ipso facto not invoking it; the converse is also
true. That these occur simultaneously within the confines of a single interro-
gation session, however, does not preclude a prior effective invocation of the
"9" Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966).
2" See notes 62, 70 & 121 supra.
"I See Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714, 719-20; North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S.
369 (1979). Even prior to the fifth amendment being held binding on the states, Mal-
loy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I (1964), the Supreme Court applied the same standard in
evaluating the admissibility of confessions in state courts as in federal courts. Miranda
v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436, 464 n:33. See also Haynes v. Washington, 313 U.S. 503
(1963).
202 Had the Supreme Court inquired whether . Michael C. had invoked the privilege
as a matter of fact. a different decision in the case might have resulted. As Justice
Powell observed in his dissent, Michael C.. when advised of his right to an attorney
twice asked "How I know you guys won't pull no police officer in and tell me he's an
attorney." 442 U.S. at 733-34. The police did not respond and made no attempt to
allay his concern. Id. at 730 n.l. It was during this part of the interrogation that
Michael C. requested his probation officer. Id. at 734. Moreover, Michael C.'s proba-
tion officer had not only instructed Michael C. to contact him immediately in the event
of contact with the police but also "not to go and admit openly to an offense [hut
rather} to get some type of advice from ... parents or a lawyer." hi. at 731-32. Finally,
Michael C. was crying during much of the interrogation session. Id. at 733 n.2. Had
the Court reviewed these facts in the context of whether Michael C. had invoked his
right to silence as a question of fact it may well have concluded that he had. If so, his
subsequent waiver would have been ineffective as a per se violation of Miranda and his
incriminating statements and sketches would have been suppressed.
20" See, e.g., United States v..Rodriguez-Gastelum, 569 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1978);
People v. Riley, 49 III. App. 3d 304, 364 N.E.2d 306 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000
(1978); Chaney v. Wainwright, 561 17 .2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1977) (Goldberg. J., dissent-
ing); U.S. v. Riggs. 537 F.2d 1219 (4th Or, 1976).
2u4
	
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 476, 479 (1966).
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right as a matter of fact. 205
 Finally, procedurally under Miranda an accused
raises the issue of the involuntariness of the alleged waiver on the basis of the
totality of the circumstances,2 " the same approach which the state utilizes in
proving that the waiver was voluntary. 207
 Were the accused to attempt to
raise the issue of invocation of the right as a factual matter, he also would use
the totality of the circumstances approach.'" Virtually the same set of facts
and circumstances, therefore, would be used in raising the issue of invocation
as a matter of fact as would be used in raising the issue of and proving
waiver. This similarity serves to obscure the distinction, already subtle, be-
tween invocation and waiver. These factors may explain the failure of courts to
consider invocation of the privilege as a factual inquiry. That courts to date
largely have not addressed the issue should not disguise its importance. A
critical difference in outcome in terms of the admissibility of incriminating
statements may, in many cases, lie in the focus of inquiry. Although both the
inquiry into whether there was an effective waiver and the inquiry into
whether there was an invocation as a matter of fact depend on a review of the
totality of the circumstances, where the focus is on whether the waiver was
knowing and intelligent, those factors which would tend to show invocation
are submerged among all the other facts and circumstances which are
evaluated in the determination. Where, however, the focus is on whether
there was an invocation, those same factors which may seem of little signifi-
cance in an evaluation of the waiver take on heightened saliency and rele-
vance. Simply put, the answer obtained often may depend on the question
asked.
In addition to the similarities between invocation as a factual matter and
waiver which serve to obfuscate the important substantive and procedural dis-
tinctions between the two, an argument can be made that courts should be
disinclined to open the avenue of invocation of the privilege under Miranda as
a question of fact. Miranda was adopted in part to avoid the vagaries of case-
by-case review of the voluntariness of confessions 2 • by introducing "concrete
constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to fol-
low. - 2")
 Opening the issue of invocation of the privilege as a matter of fact,
therefore, would be to reintroduce one of the very elements which Miranda
was designed to avoid. This, however, ignores that pre-Miranda determina-
tions of voluntariness have reappeared under Miranda as determinations of
the validity of the waiver. Prior to Miranda the standard which governed the
admissibility of confessions was voluntariness.'" The test by which the volun-
2 " Where multiple interrogation sessions are involved, the validity of a waiver ob-
tained in a session subsequent to the one in which the right to silence is initially in-
voked is governed by Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
20" See notes 62, 70 & 121 supra.
207 North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979).
2 " Sec notes 62, 70 & 121 supra.
2)1 `1
 Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 113 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
210 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 441-42 (1966),
2 " Prior to Miranda, the Supreme Court focused on whether the confession had
been voluntarily given, holding in federal cases that confessions involuntarily obtained
violated the fifth amendment. See, e.g., Braun v. U.S.. 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897). The
Court achieved 'he same result in state criminal proceedings by relying on the due
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tariness of a confession was determined was that of the totality of the cir-
cumstances:212 Miranda, therefore, has imported into the determination of
the validity of a waiver the same standard which was used in the pre-Miranda
determinations of the voluntariness of a confession. The argument that in-
quiry into invocation of the privilege as a factual matter reintroduces undesir-
able subjectivity, therefore, has little force.
There are compelling reasons supporting inquiry into invocation as a
question of fact. The primary reason is the express direction of Miranda that
an individual may indicate his desire to remain silent "in any manner, at any
time."'" Requiring a strict verbal formula to trigger the Miranda protections
fails to recognize, in contravention of that direction, that a suspect may signal
his intent to remain silent by means which fall short of an.express statement. _
Moreover, in some cases, at least arguably, a less than express indication of
the desire to remain silent may he a direct product of the intimidating and
coercive environment that Miranda was crafted to combat. In any event, a
flexible approach to the issue of invocation is more in keeping with the broad
prophylactic purpose of Miranda than is a requirement of a strict verbal for-
mula. The argument may be advanced that to require police to interpret am-
biguous statements or conduct would unduly hamper law enforcement efforts
and would place police in the position of having to second-guess a suspect's
intent. Where a suspect -manifests ambiguous conduct, however, there would
seem to be nothing to inhibit police from asking "clarifying" questions 214
determine if the suspect is indicating his desire to remain silent. Several courts
have already found that such police questions in the face of ambiguous state-
ments or conduct by a suspect do riot violate Miranda. 215 Requiring police to
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, see, e.g., Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S.
227, 241 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936), until 1964 when the
fifth amendment privilege was held binding on the states in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S.
I, 13 (1964),
An oft-quoted statement of the parameters of the voluntariness test appears in
Culombe v. Connecticut. 367 U.S. 568. 601-02 (1961):
No single litmus-paper test for constitutionally impermissible interrogation
has been evolved: neither extensive cross-questioning 	 nor undue delay
in arraignment ...: nor failure to caution a prisoner	 nor refusal to
permit communication with friends and legal counsel at stages in the pro-
ceeding when the prisoner is only a suspect....
Each of these factors, in company with all of the surrounding
circumstances—the duration of and conditions of detention ... , the man-
ifest attitude of the police towards him, his physical and mental state, the
diverse pressures which sap Or sustain his powers of resistance and self-
control—is relevant. The ultimate test remains.... Is the confession the
product of essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker? ... [Ill
his will hats been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically
impaired, the use of this confession offends clue process.
Id.
212 See note 211 supra.
21" Miranda v. Arizo na. 384 U.S. 436, 441-42.
214 U.S. v. Chansriharaj. 446 F. Stapp. 107, 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1978): U.S. v. Riggs. 537
F.2d 1219, 1222 (4th Cir. 1976).
21% See, e.g., U.S. v. Chansriharaj, 446 F. Stipp. 107, 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1978): (J. Taylor
v. Riddle, 409 F. Stipp. 631, 636 (1). Va. 1976) (question to determine whether ac-
cused's silence indicates his desire to remain silent).
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clarify a suspect's intent before proceeding with substantive interrogation does
not appear to be an undue burden. In addition, notions of equity and fun-
damental fairness would seem to support the position that because an explicit
statement. is not necessary to waive one's fifth amendment rights an explicit
statement to invoke those rights should not be. Finally, to require particular
conduct or a strict verbal formula to invoke the safeguards which Miranda
harbors would protect from the coercion of custodial interrogation, if anyone,
only the experienced and knowledgable accused while leaving the inexperi-
enced accused, the one most in need of the preventive purpose and protec-
tion of Miranda, unaided.
In Fare v. Michael C. the Court rejected a perceived attempt. to create
additional per se invocation rules or to broaden the existing tines to include
less explicit statements or conduct.. The Court's decision, however, may be
read as effectively rejecting examination of invocation of the privilege as a
matter of fact.. Not only the majority but also both dissents by-passed inquiry
into this issue. While this collective omission from consideration of invocation
as a matter of fact may have been the result of failure to recognize the is-
sue,'`"' it is also possible that this omission signals the Court's unwillingness to
open the issue of invocation as a factual question. If the latter is the explana-
tion. Fare v. Michael C. represents a further narrowing of the protections an-
nounced in Miranda 217 by limiting the accused's means of invoking the fifth
amendment privilege to those of requesting au attorney, explicitly asserting
21 " See text. at notes 203-10 supra,
217 In Harris v. New York. 401 U.S. 222 (1971), the Court allowed the use of state-
ments obtained in violation of Miranda to be used for impeachment purposes if' the
accused testified in his own behalf. Accord, Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714 (1975). But
see Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), This decision was made despite the
Miranda Court's directive that statements so obtained not be used for any pm -pose.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966). In Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433
(1974), decided on non-Miranda grounds, the Court suggested that technical errors or
omissions in the giving of Miranda warnings may not require the exclusion from evi-
dence of resulting statements in the absence of willful or negligent police conduct. Id.
at 447. This suggestion directly contravenes the Court's express statements in Miranda
that the giving of the required warnings is a prerequisite to the admission into evi-
dence of self-incriminating admissions against the accused. Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 444, 479 (1966). In Michigan v.' Mosley, 423 U.S. 911 (1975), the Court. held
that the admissibility of statements obtained as a result of custodial interrogation in a
session subsequent to one in which the accused initially invoked the right to silence
depends on whether the accused's right to cut off' questioning was "scrupulously hon-
orer and the circumstances surrounding the renewed interrogation. Id. at 104.
Miranda, however, implicitly required that all interrogation cease, or alternatively, that
interrogation not be renewed until an attorney is preQent. Miranda v, Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966). In Oregon v. Mathiason, 129 U.S. 492 (1977), the Court held
that all police interrogation is not custodial interrogation requiring that the suspect be
advised of his rights. Id. at 494-95. See Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
Beckwith and Mathiason taken together with Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969) (de-
fendant arrested and questioned in his bedroom) seem to require arrest as an antece-
dent to the giving of the Miranda warnings. The Miranda Court instructed, however,
that the warnings be given not only when the individual is in custody but. also when he
is "otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way...." Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S, 436, 444 (1966).
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the privilege or simply refusing to make any statement at all. There is some
explicit language in the majority opinion to that effect. The Court stated:
We conclude	 . that whether statements obtained during sub-
sequent interrogation of a juvenile who has asked to see his proba-
tion officer, but who has not asked to consult with an attorney or expressly
asserted his right to remain silent, are admissible on the basis of waiver
reIllailiS a question to be resolved on the totality of circumstances
surrounding interrogation.. .."' 8
If the Court believes that it is not unreasonable to require that juveniles, to-
wards whom it has had an historically protective attitude,'" explicitly request
a lawyer or expressly state a desire to remain silent, there can be no doubt
that it would accept no less from an adult accused.
CONCLUSION
In Fare v. Michael C. the Supreme Court held that a minor's request for
his probation officer during custodial interrogation is not a per se invocation
of his rights requiring the termination of police questioning under Miranda.
In declining to adopt a per se rule, the Court explicitly affirmed the Miranda
totality of the circumstances approach to the determination of waiver as pro-
viding sufficient protection of the rights of juveniles during custodial interro-
gation.
The importance of the Court's decision lies in the possibility that the
Court may he signaling an inclination to require that a suspect explicitly state
that he wishes to remain silent or to consult with an attorney in order to
trigger the protective device of Miranda that interrogation cease. On this read-
ing of Fare v. Michael C., its effect within the context of a single interrogation
session would be to allow police questioning to continue where a suspect's
statements or conduct falls short of an unambiguous announcement of his
intent to remain silent. The admissibility of resulting statements would be
judged not on whether the accused's statements or conduct. were reasonably
indicative, as a factual matter, of an intent to remain silent but rather on the
validity of the subsequent waiver. It has been suggested that divergent conclu-
sions on admissibility often may depend on whether the focus of inquiry is on
invocation or waiver. Unfortunately, because the Court did not explicitly hold
that express statements will now be required, the law regarding the available
means of invoking the privilege under Miranda remains unsettled.
PATRICIA A. ASACK
118 442 U.S. at 728 (emphasis added).
21 " See cases cited at note 175 supra.
